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Justice Louis Brandeis famously described the states as laboratories1 where individual jurisdictions
can experiment with various legal strategies. In the wake of Blakley v. Washington2 and United States
v. Booker,3 those laboratories have been working overtime. Since June 2004, both state legislatures
and state courts have grappled with the significance of the United States Supreme Court’s treatment
of the Sixth Amendment in sentencing. It is unsurprising, given the extraordinary significance and
potential reach of Blakely and Booker,4 that this Herculean task has produced divergent results.
Although there are many potential ways to sort those results, for the purposes of these observations, we have divided them into states of “evolution” and states of “denial.” Evolution states have read
Blakely and Booker fairly, accepted that Blakely controls what is permissible within their sentencing
regimes, and responded in ways that best fit their circumstances. Still, there are differences in how
these jurisdictions have evolved. Many of the states responding to Blakely (particularly those with
active sentencing commissions) have retained their more presumptive sentencing systems.5 Others
have followed Booker toward a more advisory system of guiding judicial discretion at sentencing. In
contrast, denial states, acting through their state supreme courts, have found ways to repudiate that
Blakely even applies to their systems, despite compelling evidence to the contrary. While often roughly
tracking this evolution and denial dichotomy, the articles and materials in this Issue provide both a
general overview and a thorough study of the individual experiences of eight states.
I. Facing the Challenge

Don Stemen and Daniel F. Wilhelm, both from the Vera Institute of Justice, provide a national perspective and confront Justice O’Connor’s dire prediction that Blakely would be the end of the
experiment in structured sentencing. As they note, a “funny thing has happened . . . on sentencing
reform’s trip to the dustbin of history. . . . [Blakely has not] hastened the eradication of sentencing
innovations.”6 In fact, a number of jurisdictions have worked diligently to achieve continuity in their
overall philosophies of sentencing, although Blakely has certainly required changes. Indeed, many
states have recognized that the post-Blakely and post-Booker world requires modifications to their
punishment schemes. The sentencing systems in these jurisdictions are evolving to meet the
changed constitutional landscape.
Dale G. Parent and Professor Richard S. Frase, two giants of the modern sentencing reform
movement, describe in their article the two basic responses of these states as reflecting either “compliance” or “avoidance.”7 Although other responses to Blakely exist,8 the evolution states seem to
have sought compliance primarily by adding extended jury fact-finding to presumptive sentencing
systems (sometimes called Blakely-ization) and appear to have pursued avoidance mainly through a
system of more advisory sentencing guidelines (sometimes called Booker-ization).
Each individual state’s story is different and eight of them are well-catalogued by the various
authors in this Issue. Yet Stemen and Wilhelm point to some larger trends of “practical balancing.”9
In states like Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington, and Oregon, where judges historically had
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imposed comparatively few sentences above the presumptive range, it is perhaps not a shock that
Blakely-ization is the dominant result. Likewise, in states like Tennessee and Indiana, where judges
appear to have imposed a majority of sentences above the presumptive range in the past, the resulting Booker-ization may have been expected.10 This is, of course, just one way to analyze a policy
choice and may itself be related to other factors, most notably the existence and vigor of the state’s
sentencing commission.
Concerning Minnesota, the state courts have forthrightly accepted Blakely and applied it to its system of presumptive sentencing guidelines. Parent and Frase describe how Minnesota has responded
by following a compliance approach primarily, but also by engaging in some avoidance techniques,
including widening the presumptive sentencing range. They posit that Minnesota’s resilience in the
face of the Blakely onslaught stems in large part from four crucial decisions made years ago in the
early days of the state’s guidelines. “Those decisions were (1) to view guideline development as a policy-making process, (2) to use conviction offenses rather than ‘real’ offenses to determine
presumptive sentences, (3) to define a narrow range of departure criteria, and (4) to promote a low
judicial departure rate from the guidelines.”11
Professor Ronald Wright, the leading academic authority on North Carolina sentencing, details
the debate between the “centralizers” and the trial court actors in the Tar Heel State.12 Again, there
was no real question as to whether Blakely applied. The discussion turned quickly to the nature of the
response, which ultimately embraced a compliance approach. Wright analyzes the significance of the
sentencing commission and other centralizing actors. He concludes that in “states like North Carolina with an active group of players who advocate for predictability and resource planning, an
expanded role for juries at sentencing is likely to result.”13
Turning to Blakely’s epicenter, Washington obviously understood that its sentencing system
needed refurbishing. Lenell Nussbaum, a member of the Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, provides an insider’s account of how that state mainly pursued a compliance response.
Among other important provisions, Washington chose to make its list of factors that can support an
exceptional (more severe) sentence exclusive.14 (A copy of that legislation appears at the end of this
Issue.15) Reflecting the importance of the sentencing commission to the ongoing evolution of Washington’s sentencing policy, the legislature directed the Commission to keep working on these
issues.”
Professor Tom Lininger, the Chair of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, supplies another
firsthand account of the process that resulted in Oregon adopting a mainly compliance response to
Blakely. He notes the important role that Oregon’s governor, a former prosecutor and a former
judge, played in reaching this resolution and, as in North Carolina, the value of presumptive guidelines to resource planning.16 “While some judges may have longed for a return to the days of
unfettered judicial discretion, the Oregon Legislature had a strong stake in predictable sentencing:
accurate forecasting of prison populations is necessary in order to budget money for prison beds.”17
Recent sentencing developments in New Jersey are reminiscent of the federal experience. Bennett
Barlyn, Executive Director of the New Jersey Commission to Review Criminal Sentencing, describes
how a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court provided the Garden State with an avoidance response
to Blakely. After rejecting the views of the denial states that Blakely did not apply (see below), “the Court
expressed its confidence that by excising the presumptive-term provision from the Code and thereby
preserving the remainder of the sentencing provisions in compliance with Blakely, uniformity would
in no way be sacrificed or otherwise diminished.”18 Barlyn then questions the wisdom of the court’s
preference for an avoidance, instead of a compliance, remedy—particularly given its stated desire for
uniformity. “After repeatedly paying fealty to the assumed intent of the Legislature in crafting its remedy, it is odd that the Court perceived no prospective role the legislative branch or a jury could play in
addressing the conspicuous crater left in the Code because of its decision.”19
II. Judging with Heads in the Sand

Several states have taken a dramatically different tack. Despite a belief by many commentators that
the sentencing systems in these states are constitutionally indistinguishable from the one at issue in
Blakely,20 the courts in these denial states21 have somehow concluded that Blakely does not apply.
Accordingly, at least for now, there is no judicial pressure on these states to modify their systems.
Tennessee straddles the line between an evolution state and a denial state. As David Raybin, a former member of the now-defunct Tennessee Sentencing Commission who served as an advisor to the
Governor’s post-Blakely task force, recounts, nearly everyone except a bare majority of the Tennessee
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Supreme Court seems to understand that Blakely invalidated key aspects of Tennessee’s sentencing
system. The Tennessee Supreme Court apparently concluded that Booker somehow virtually overruled Blakely.22 Raybin describes the court as believing that “a presumptive sentencing scheme may
survive constitutional scrutiny because the enhancements are not as ‘mandatory’ as were the point
increases required under the old federal system examined in Booker.”23 Both the defendant and the
Tennessee attorney general asked the court to reconsider its views to no avail. That case is now pending certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. Despite its supreme court’s denial that
Blakely presented a problem, the Tennessee Legislature pressed on and adopted an avoidance
response. (A copy of that legislation appears at the end of this Issue.24) Other denial states have not
been as proactive.
In California, which notably lacks a state sentencing commission, the state supreme court similarly denied that Blakely applied to its sentencing system, and no political actors have moved to blunt
the impact of that decision. Jonathan Soglin and J. Bradley O’Connell, leading sentencing advocates
in California and Staff Attorneys for the First District Appellate Project, report that the California
Supreme Court’s decision came in the face of an “‘emerging majority view’ among the California
Courts of Appeal . . . that the California scheme suffered from the same constitutional defects as the
Washington regime reviewed in Blakely.”25 The California Supreme Court read Booker not only as a
clarification of Blakely but also as one that focused on the amount of judicial discretion instead of the
need for factual findings. Soglin and O’Connell observe that “perhaps [the] most illuminating”26
aspect of the court’s decision is its conclusion that the United States Supreme Court’s “‘precedents
do not draw a bright line.’”27 Now, “the state courts of appeal are summarily rejecting Blakely claims.
And in the trial courts, prosecutors and judges are reverting to pre-Blakely procedures.”28 As in Tennessee, Soglin and O’Connell note that the next battle may well be waged in federal district court on
habeas review.
Finally, New Mexico presents a case study in how a state supreme court ruling can stop legislative
sentencing reform in its tracks. Tony Ortiz, the Deputy Director of the New Mexico Sentencing Commission, details how a legislative fix (largely pursuing a compliance approach) worked its way
through the New Mexico Commission. Believing that Blakely applied to New Mexico, the Commission sought to have post-Blakely legislation adopted. Although the legislation was not passed in the
2005 session because of competing legislative demands, the Commission asked the governor to
expand the scope of the otherwise subject-matter-limited 2006 legislative session to include the
Blakely fix legislation. Then, the New Mexico Supreme Court joined the denial crowd; it determined
that Blakely (as seen after Booker) did not apply. (A copy of that opinion is reproduced at the end of
the Ortiz article.) The Commission promptly withdrew its 2006 legislative request. As Ortiz notes,
“At this point in time, there is no ‘constitutional’ urgency for the contemplated amendments to the
core New Mexico sentencing provisions. . . .”29

“There are many open issues
in the wake of Blakely and
Booker, including issues that
should capture the attention of
the United States Supreme
Court.”

III. What Is Present May Be Prologue

Predicting the future—particularly in today’s sentencing environment—is a risky venture at best.
Yet, it seems likely that the current multifaceted development of sentencing in the states may continue. We have painted a picture of “evolution” and “denial.” The evolution states have taken a fair
reading of Blakely and, in the lexicon of Parent and Frase, largely pursued paths that seek either compliance with or avoidance of the pro-jury spirit of Blakely. Regardless, these states have squarely
addressed the holding of Blakely, which (oddly enough) can reasonably accommodate both compliance and avoidance. We agree with our authors that the denial states—acting through their
respective state supreme courts—have pretended that Blakely does not say what it plainly says irrespective of its putative spirit. These courts have unfairly read Booker as almost overruling Blakely.
So what may the future bring? The fate of the denial states may be easier to predict so we start there
first. Tennessee, California, and New Mexico are likely to cling to their strained interpretations for as
long as possible in an effort to insulate their systems from Blakely. It will probably fall to the United
States Supreme Court to extract these state courts from their ostrich-like positions. If the Supreme
Court does not take up the challenge or, to our surprise, agrees with the deniers’ views, there is little
hope for rapid systemic change. If the Supreme Court eventually does inform these states that they are
in error, at least California and New Mexico30 will have to start from scratch as if it was June 2004 and
the Blakely ink was not yet dry.31 The retroactivity issues will be massive and perhaps will push these
jurisdictions toward a more advisory (or avoidance-oriented) remedy in order to more easily facilitate
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resentencing. However, these states might also have the benefit of the further refinement of the Blakely
and Booker line of cases to guide their choice—an asset not available to the evolution states.
Indeed, the prospect for the evolution states in the coming months and years could be a bit
cloudy. These jurisdictions will probably continue to encourage their sentencing systems to evolve by
interpreting the Blakely and Booker progeny reasonably; they have already staked out their likely
paths of either compliance or avoidance. Whether they stay on those paths depends on the costs. The
avoidance jurisdictions that opted for more advisory systems are unlikely to revert to a presumptive
approach unless the possible resulting sentencing disparity or economic distress resulting from
potential increases in prison populations becomes a political liability. The compliance jurisdictions
that opted to continue with presumptive guidelines are unlikely to move to a more advisory scheme
unless the cost of that choice becomes unbearable, perhaps in terms of perceived inappropriately low
sentences for heinous offenders or an expensive push toward higher sentences overall to address
those heinous few. Everything else being equal, however, momentum—or perhaps, paradoxically,
inertia—may continue to propel these states along their already chosen path.
But how will these evolution jurisdictions deal with the legal questions that remain unanswered?
There are many open issues in the wake of Blakely and Booker, including issues that should capture
the attention of the United States Supreme Court.32 For example, will the “prior conviction” exception survive at the level of the federal constitution?33 Will Blakely apply to determinations of
consecutive versus concurrent sentences? Perhaps most significantly, will Blakely apply to such
things as judicial juvenile transfer procedures, restitution, or other non-prison sentences? The resolution of these issues can easily alter an evolution state’s cost-benefit calculation. No one knows
when the Supreme Court will resolve these issues, but it seems inevitable that it will eventually deal
with many of them. Compared to the 2004–2005, rapid-fire Blakely/Booker decisions, the Court may
be taking a breather from redrawing the American sentencing map, but it cannot avoid these vital
issues forever.
Now is the time for states to strengthen their mechanisms to deal with the impending shifts in the
sentencing seas. We continue to believe that accountable yet independent-minded sentencing commissions are the best frontline policy-making tool that any jurisdiction can employ.34 Sentencing
commissions are far from perfect,35 but they can be important and effective when they are adequately
resourced, adept at developing and analyzing the objective data that can depoliticize and most rationally inform sentencing policy, and draw together essential criminal justice actors for debate and
consensus building.36 Moreover, this is a unique opportunity for them to hone their skills. Sentencing
commissions can and should demonstrate not only that they deserve a seat at the table but also that
the others at the table need them to be there. With continued attention and hard work, sentencing
commissions can live up to their noblest ideals. And our sentencing systems will be the better for it.
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Professor Chanenson is also a member of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. The views expressed
here are not necessarily those of the Commission, its other members, or staff.
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); see also
Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency,
and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1391 (2005) (discussing extent and limitations
of laboratory metaphor in sentencing context).
124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). We assume a basic understanding of Blakely and Booker. For those readers needing a
primer on the topic, several of the articles that follow oblige. See, e.g., Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm,
Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 7 (2005) (in this
Issue).
See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Supreme Court Cleanup in Aisle 4, SLATE (July 16, 2004), available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2104014 (“Blakely is the biggest criminal decision not just of this past term, not
just of this decade, not just of the Rehnquist Court, but perhaps in the history of the Supreme Court.”).
We recognize that the terms “presumptive” and “advisory” are often “crude labels” that at best approximate
the level of discretion afforded the sentencing judge and that “there are an infinite number of stops between
a purely advisory approach and a completely mandatory framework.” Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of
Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155, 157-58 (2005). We use these terms loosely in this Article
because our discussion focuses on macro-level trends.
Of course, those jurisdictions that had advisory sentencing guidelines before Blakely had no pressing reason to alter their systems. See United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
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Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18
FED. SENT. REP. 7, 7 (2005) (in this Issue).
We adopt these terms from Parent and Frase, see Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota Will
Weather Blakely’s Blast, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 12, 16 & n.40 (2005) (in this Issue), who themselves modified
them from Professor Kevin Reitz. See Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1108-18 (2005) (identifying Blakely “approach” and
“avoidance” methods). These are useful terms but it is important to recognize that they flow from a reading
of Blakely that may reflect a certain predisposition in favor of jury fact-finding that is not required by the language of Blakely itself. For instance, despite the Blakely majority’s impassioned defense of the jury, it
seemed to allow the old unguided sentencing systems in which the jury did nothing more than authorize the
criminal code’s maximum punishment and permit its imposition pursuant to the unfettered discretion of the
sentencing judge. See, e.g., Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2540-41; Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing:
Blakely v. Washington Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 60, 64 (2004)
(noting that “the Blakely decision allows for some seemingly perverse effects”). For example, Judge Easterbrook, in his dissent to the Seventh Circuit’s Booker opinion, approved of open-ended, unguided sentencing
and concluded that the Supreme Court “saw this not as an ‘evasion’ but as a natural application of the Constitution.” United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 519 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L. J. 377, 380 (2005) (discussing options and proposing the concept of “‘Indeterminate Structured Sentencing’ (‘ISS’), an
indeterminate sentencing system (that is, a system that includes discretionary parole release authority) in
which a Super Commission promulgates two sets of coordinated guidelines that constrain both sentencing
and release powers”).
Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18
FED. SENT. REP. 7 (2005) (in this Issue).
Id. at 10.
Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota Will Weather Blakely’s Blast, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 12, 13
(2005) (in this Issue).
Ronald F. Wright, Blakely and the Centralizers in North Carolina, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 19, 20-22 (2005) (in this
Issue).
Id. at 22.
Lenell Nussbaum, Sentencing in Washington after Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 23, 25 (2005) (in
this Issue). See also Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L. J. 377, 426 (2005)
(discussing post-Blakely concern about viability of nonexclusive factors).
See Washington Senate Bill 5477, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 62 (2005) (in this Issue) (presenting Washington statutory language).
Tom Lininger, Oregon’s Response to Blakely, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 29, 30 & n. 23 (2005) (in this Issue).
Id. at 30.
Bennett Barlyn, Sentencing Law Under the Knife: Judicial Surgery, the New Jersey Supreme Court and State v.
Natale, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 35, 38 (2005) (in this Issue).
Id. at 39.
See Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington,
18 FED. SENT. REP. 7, 7 (2005) (in this Issue) (listing Tennessee, California, and New Mexico as having sentencing systems similar to Washington’s).
One of the authors has strongly argued that two states, Pennsylvania and Michigan, are not denial states,
despite their conclusion that they have dodged the Blakely bullet, because the indeterminate nature of their
sentencing systems and the fact that their guidelines only constrain the minimum sentence imposed place
them truly outside Blakely’s grasp. See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54
EMORY L. J. 377, 435-46 (2005). See also People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 286 n.14 (Mich. 2004); Commonwealth v. Smith, 863 A.2d 1172, 1178–79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). For a discussion, however, of why such
systems might be implicated by Blakley, see Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v.
Washington Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 60, 63-64 (2004).
David Louis Raybin, The Anticipated Resolution of the Blakely Split of Authority in the States: Will the United
States Supreme Court Dance the Tennessee Waltz?, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 41 (2005) (in this Issue).
Id.
See Tennessee Senate Bill 2249, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 72 (2005) (presenting Tennessee statutory language) (in
this Issue).
Jonathan D. Soglin & J. Bradley O’Connell, Blakely, Booker, & Black: Beyond the Bright Line, 18 FED. SENT. REP.
46, 46 (2005) (in this Issue) (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 47.
Id. (quoting People v. Black, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740, 755 (Cal. 2005)).
Id.
Tony Ortiz, The New Mexico Sentencing Commission’s Legislative Proposal Subsequent to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 54, 55 (2005) (in this Issue).
Tennessee will be spared this carnage because of the prospective legislative move to an advisory guidelines
system. See Tennessee Senate Bill 2249, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 72 (2005) (in this Issue) (presenting Tennessee
statutory language).
Colorado is in a similar situation despite the fact that its supreme court properly interpreted Blakely to apply
to the Centennial State. See, e.g., Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative
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Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 7, 9 (2005) (discussing that “neither of the competing
bills in the state came to a vote in the general assembly” and that because “the Colorado decision specified
no immediate remedy, the state is left without a solution to their Blakely problem”) (in this Issue).
See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, The Waiting Is the Hardest Part . . ., Sentencing Law and Policy, at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/05/the_waiting_in_.html (May 4, 2005)
(identifying several “Blakely/Booker issues that I think most urgently merit the Supreme Court’s attention”);
Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1082, 1093-94 (2005) (discussing unresolved issues); Douglas A. Berman, Supreme Court Cleanup in
Aisle 4, Slate (July 16, 2004), available at http://www.slate.com/id/2104014 (“It is surely going to take
decades to sort out what exactly Blakely means, and there are going to be a lot of messy periods along the
way.”).
Tom Lininger notes that it has already fallen with respect to certain prior juvenile adjudications in Oregon.
Tom Lininger, Oregon’s Response to Blakely, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 29, 32 (2005) (citing State v. Harris, 339 Or.
157 (2005)) (in this Issue).
Cf. Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18
FED. SENT. REP. 7. 10 (2005) (“With dedicated staff and proficiency in evaluating the impact of case law and
legislation, sentencing commissions were well-suited to determine quickly the impact of Blakely on states’
criminal justice systems. Indeed, states’ responses to Blakely may be partially identified by the recommendations put forth by these commissions.”) (in this Issue); Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota
Will Weather Blakely’s Blast, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 12, 12 (2005) (“In retrospect, Blakely’s modest impact in Minnesota resulted from both the context within which the Commission developed its guidelines and key policy
decisions it made in 1978 and 1979.”) (in this Issue).
See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems,
Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1357 (2005) (“problems generated
by limited availability of data are compounded by the scarcity of efforts to link or compare data and sentencing experiences across states. While state commissions have developed good working relationships and
there is a national association of state sentencing commissions, there is no indication that, either on their
own or as a group, the state sentencing commissions have tried to develop common research projects.”); Id.
at 1351 (“Sentencing reform everywhere can be improved if state actors make sentencing information and
sentencing data publicly available and easily accessible and speak to other systems.”).
See, e.g., Michael Tonry, SENTENCING MATTERS 59-62 (1996).
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